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Chasing a mirage
Air Commodore (R
) Khalid Iqbal
Pak-US relations have all along
followed a roller-coaster profile. Presently, these are enduring a
snowballing mistrust. Both sides realise that their bilateral
relations as well as associated multilateral interactions are
mutually beneficial. It is in this backdrop that droves of American
visitors keep landing in Islamabad. When some of them go back and
testify before congressional committees, their perception of the
problems being faced by Pakistan is remarkably accurate. They
virtually sound as if they were hired lobbyists for Pakistan.
Despite such wonderful clarity on the issues of vital concern to
Pakistan, the solutions that
emerge are often hopeless and hence disappointing.
Onus surely rests on American
policy-making process, as indeed on its statesmanship that readily
get swayed by the bureaucratic interpretations of otherwise
clear-cut issues. Despite high-sounding words like strategic
partnership and strategic dialogue etc, bilateral relations are
mired in a cumulative trust deficit, and are unable to go beyond the
lowly orbits of routine and tactical matters. Rhetoric exists, the
substance is missing.
While American policy-makers are
often repeating the rote script that they made a grave mistake to
abandon Pakistan in the eighties, and that such mistake would not be
repeated, a common Pakistani feels that USA has already abandoned
Pakistan amidst multidimensional crises of grave dimensions.
In Pakistan, there is a growing
perception that its overly simplistic and symbiotic association with
America’s GWOT/ OCO related objectives is not compatible with its
medium- to long-term national security concerns, and thus is not
sustainable. In this context, difference of acuity on some of the
vital issues is precariously high.
For example, drones stand thoroughly
discredited as a military tool against the extremists; American
ownership of these vehicles carries a phenomenal negative political
baggage. From operational utility standpoint, usage of such aerial
vehicles is proving counterproductive. Ratio of deaths of militants
and innocents is around 1:10. Such human tragedy cannot be pushed
under the carpet in the garb of innocent-looking terminologies like
collateral damage. Public opinion in
Pakistan is vehemently hostile
towards usage of drones.
Indian influence gathering in
Afghanistan is another irritant.
India has been covertly trying, albeit with American blessing, for
influence paddling in Afghanistan. As a spinoff, India has already
acquired the capability to carry out effective covert subversive
operations in Pakistani areas adjoining Afghanistan. Apparently
Americans seem to be grooming India, as a part of a contingency
plan, to take its role as proxy occupier of Afghanistan as and when
its own stay becomes untenable. Proliferation of Indian influence is
of strategic dimension that could pose a two-front dilemma for
Pakistan. America’s role of a mere bystander in the context of
clearly visible Indian splurge for destabilising Pakistan by
supporting the extremist fighters in cash and kind, especially via
Afghanistan, is rather damaging in the context of enduring
cooperation between Pakistan and America.
Moreover, America is not doing
enough to influence India with respect to resolution of vital
issues. Despite President Obama’s campaign days’ promise, Kashmir issue continues to be dormant; and another related issue of water
diversion from rivers flowing into
Pakistan through
Kashmir have acquired serious
dimension.
On the issue of dynamics of regional
terrorism, America is overly tilted towards Indian point of view.
While terrorist outfits pose a threat globally, Indian stance that
Pakistan should ensure that Mumbai-like incidents do not recur is
absurd; yet Robert Gates fell in the Indian trap during his recent
visit to the region. He almost delivered a war ultimatum to Pakistan
on India’s behalf.
Fissile material management is
another issue where America has abandoned Pakistan. Any fissile
material regime without taking into account the existing stockpiles
of fissile material puts Pakistan at an inherent and perpetual
unfavourable position vis-a-vis India on two counts. Firstly, being
a relatively late starter of nuclear programme, Pakistan’s stock of
fissile material is much smaller than India’s. Secondly, as a result
of nuclear deal with USA (Agreement 123), India has eight reactors
outside IAEA safeguards, capable of producing sufficient fissile
material to produce over 100 nuclear warheads per year. Hence, any
arbitrary cutoff date to stop the production of fissile material
without addressing these inadequacies would put Pakistan at a grave
security risk in the context of its maintaining a minimum credible
deterrence.
Another event that has aroused
anti-America sentiment is America’s fondness for micromanaging the
internal affairs of Pakistan. Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act could have
accrued the Americans a lot of goodwill provided it was not
torpedoed by intrusive stipulations. Pakistani nation is accustomed
to the strings attached to American aid bills like Glenn, Symington,
Pressler and Brown amendments. However no one expected that Platt
class restrictions would be imposed. Some of the terms are so
intrusive that even Pakistan’s city or district governments are not
used to this type of invasive micromanagement.
Kerry-Lugar document indeed shocked
the people of Pakistan, because despite enormous economic hardships
suffered by the nation, the much-awaited legislation had brought
only peanuts of an aid, along with a string of humiliating
conditionalities.
It brought discontent to the armed
forces for the reason that despite public and private praise for
professional excellence in their role in combating terrorism,
Kerry-Lugar legislation, while dealing with civil sector aid had
incorporated uncalled-for belittling comments towards the armed
forces.
This fiasco created frustration at a
number of places in America as well. Government and Congress were
let down because they expected that the bill will accrue laurels. To
their perception, it was a document par excellence, for development
of long-term partnership with Pakistan.
One can observe a clearly
discernable incremental approach by the Americans to tighten the
screws around already suffocating strategic straitjacket imposed on
Pakistan. They are applying all sorts of arm-twisting methods to
have their way; pending the payment of arrears of Coalition Support
Fund is just one example. Such actions are further weakening the
people-level goodwill towards America. People of Pakistan today
stand emotionally detached from the American interpretation of
terrorism, its causes, origin and the methodology to combat it.
If one raises two cardinal queries
regarding the Overseas Counterinsurgency Operations (OCO) and war on
terrorism in the context of our region ie which is the country that
is putting in maximum resource effort and which is the country
helping the sustenance of extremist fighters economically?;
ironically, unanimous answer to both these queries would be, ‘of
course United States of America is performing both feats
simultaneously.’ This proverbial burning of candle at both ends is
the fundamental fault line undermining the ongoing operations. The
other one is a state of deliberate ambiguity in the mission
statement. These contradictions are not letting the bigger picture
take a recognisable format. Carrying on an insurgency is a
resource-intensive activity. Any such operation would soon lose its
steam if finances and logistics are cut off. Extremists are thriving
financially as US dollars are reaching them indirectly, though
continuously, through security companies engaged for protecting
American logistics convoys moving in Afghanistan.
Taliban provide protective escort to
American conveys through their respective area of responsibility, in
exchange for protection fee ranging between 10-20% of the cost of
protected consignment. This is further supplemented by
percentage-based extortions on drug and timber trades. Put together,
booty makes a decent percentage of what Pakistan is getting through
embarrassing Kerry-Lugar arrangement!
Pakistani nation has evolved
remarkable consensus on two cardinal aspects of this war. Firstly,
the extremists must be eliminated through a composite means, of
which application of military instrument is just one small aspect.
Secondly, this war is not of our making and its blossoming within
Pakistani territories is an outcome of faulty operational strategy,
adopted by occupation forces in Afghanistan, in pursuit to its
overseas counterinsurgency operations.
Pakistan is indeed paying a
prohibitive price due to its association with the faulty COIN
strategy that Americans have been executing in Afghanistan. In the
context of operation Rah-i-Nijat, and operation Mushtarik, some of
the vital border check-posts on Afghan side, adjoining the
operational areas, were abandoned by NATO-led security forces, prior
to commencement of these operations. ISAF/NATO operations are
generally focused at causing a mass emigration of extremist elements
to Pakistan than striving to eliminate them.
Blanket attribution of all acts of
terrorism to al-Qaeda or Taliban is no longer tenable. Multitudes of
state and non-state actors have entered the arena of extremism and
terrorism working often at cross-purposes. Regional and
extra-regional intelligence agencies are muddying the water by
focusing on destabilising Pakistan. While all events are being
merrily attributed to al-Qaeda and Taliban; other players are having
a filed day.
Pakistan’s squeezing is no
longer justifiable, as armed forces of Pakistan have done a
wonderful job in Swat, Malakand and are now replicating the
excellent performance in South Waziristan, Bajaur and other areas.
Recent capture of Damadola in Bajaur Agency after killing over 2000
militants shows the resolve of Pakistan’s armed forces, as indeed
the nation’s, to take on the extremists head-on.
Sustained economic revival of our
economy is dependent on US and European market access to our select
textile products on zero tariff basis. Nothing concrete is
forthcoming on this. Power shortage is another acute problem that
Americans could help to resolve. Facilitation for setting up of
nuclear power plants, under IAEA safeguards, is an off-the-shelf
solution; which is being foot-dragged by America.
A lot remains to be done, on
non-military fronts, for sustainable eradication of extremism. The
much-awaited ‘Promised Wonderland’ in the form of ROZs in our tribal
belt is not yet in sight. An alternative education plan as a
substitute to religious seminaries is also equally evasive.
Pakistan-bashing would not bring any
dividends; it will only curtail American leverage. Allies must work
in an atmosphere of trust and harmony for a win-win finale. If
corrective actions are not taken, anti-America sentiment would
continue to rise exponentially. Americans need to be responsive
towards the sensitivities of Pakistan and carry it along as a
trusted ally. Pakistan alone can not carry on chasing the mirage,
indefinitely.
Henry Kissinger once observed that
in this world it is often dangerous to be an enemy of the United
States, but to be a friend is fatal; or words to that effect. An
all-out effort should be made by the two sides to prevent these
relations from becoming a yet another living example of Kissinger’s
remarks about friends of America. |