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The
stakes in
Waziristan
Syed Mohammad Ali
As the gradual elimination of the
Taliban in Malakand division by the Pakistan Army enters its decisive
phase, Waziristan braces for a much-awaited showdown following
Islamabad’s decision to finally destroy Baitullah Mahsud’s terrorist
infrastructure which is after all the principal source of the nation’s
current woes.
Militancy in the NWFP is sustained by
competing powers seeking to secure their strategic and energy interests
in the complex milieu of South and Central Asia. The question arises
that if this insurgency happens to survive a few more years, will
Islamabad be able to keep the Pukhtun nationalist elements on its side
against the religious militants? It is crucial to assess the political
capacity of the ANP government to successfully deal with the present
conflict. According to a senior NWFP government official, over three
million people are already internally displaced. This is in addition to
the Afghan refugees who are still in large number and a great burden on
the establishment.
When a full-scale military operation is
launched in Waziristan, more people will
become displaced and the government of the NWFP will have to grapple
with an inflated humanitarian crisis. It will be of essence to watch how
long the military action takes to achieve its objective and what tactics
the enemy adopts to escape the firepower and how much political support
it gets from the population of the affected areas.
There are lessons to learn from how the
Indian army successfully dealt with the Khalistan movement. Though
dealing with a small-scale uprising in Indian Punjab plains, compared to
hilly and forest terrain of the NWFP, six factors which contributed to
the success of Indian army operation in quelling the separatist movement
were quality intelligence; diplomatic and political isolation of the
terrorists from international and domestic support base; timely
elimination of their leadership; element of surprise; ruthless
elimination of the terrorists without any remorse, and finally effective
management of the humanitarian crisis.
A decisive factor in the strategic
matrix of the conflict in Waziristan would be the response
of the civilian population of the tribal areas. How well the government
is prepared to tackle the eventuality of mass exodus from Fata and how
much resources it has to properly organise IDPs’ interim shelters, will
equally determine the end-result of the military operation which in
itself is a much delayed action. Then, the government will need to
arrange cash money to offer to the displaced families. These factors
will be of utmost importance to keep the uprooted population of tribal
areas satisfied and on the side of the government and to prevent them
from succumbing to temptations or coercion of the Taliban and the
Baitullah Mehsud gang with a view to demoralise the Pakistani troops.
Conservative Pushtun families may find
it difficult to cooperate in the house to house search by troops given
their cultural and traditional sensitivities. The government will have
to draw up a comprehensive political and economic strategy to isolate
TTP leadership before it launches a military operation in Waziristan. Despite hectic high-level diplomacy, US has not been very successful in
gaining substantive military and economic support from its European Nato
allies for expanding military operations in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, the US and Nato are
fighting the war away from their homeland whereas the stakes for the
state and military of Pakistan are much higher while fighting on its own
territory and to win the war it cannot rely on promises of external
financial help alone. US aid pledges aside, the government will need to raise resources on its
own as well. We have to get rid of our dead wood, tighten belts,
possibly postpone some developmental plans and probably increase defence
budget and cut corners where we can.
Political expediency and localised
politics based on ‘baradari’ will have to be shelved if the state of
Pakistan has to survive this decisive battle for its identity. It is not
a war like 1965 where the military could stop Indians from advancing on
Wagah and Chawinda fronts but a war in which the enemy is invisible and
has already penetrated deep inside our territory; not just the resorts
of Swat and Malam Jabba but the streets, homes and markets of Islamabad,
Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar have become battlefronts.
The leadership must realise that the
success and sacrifices of our troops can go to waste if we do not
succeed in winning hearts and minds of the large displaced population.
Any lapses in timely, effective and efficient relief and rehabilitation
of the continuing streams of the displaced persons could ignite the
Pukhtun nationalist sentiments in those areas with long-term adverse
effects to the objective of this war.
On May 2, 2003 George W. Bush in a
speech from the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln
proudly declared victory in Iraq war but six years later Washington
still remains mired in the quagmire that Iraq has become.
A study of the Irish guerilla war shows
that the Irish Republican Army was never really a major strategic threat
to the British military in Ireland. Nor were they ever in a position to
engage them in conventional warfare. IRA leader Richard Mulcahy deplored
the fact that they had not been able to drive the British "out of
anything bigger than a fairly good size police barracks.” But they had
made Ireland ungovernable except by military means. The political,
military and financial costs of remaining in Ireland were higher than
the British government was prepared to afford. This fact forced it to
enter into negotiations with the Irish political leaders.
Similarly, Taliban by engaging Pakistani
military forces are diverting its resources into an internal war rather
than let it be prepared against any potential external threat. Today the
stakes of this conflict in Fata and the NWFP are higher for Pakistan’s
security than they have ever been before. This could be the decisive
battle for the identity and future of our nation and like 1965 or 1971
we should not totally depend on the US alone for winning it.
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